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he prospect for objectivity and determinate truth-values
in the realm of moral inquiry has certainly gained
greater sympathy in recent years. Traditional arguments
from logical positivists, which maintained that value
judgements, as opposed to factual judgements, were devoid of
meaning or, at best, some lower order of non-cognitive meaning
have been abandoned (Misak, 1994, 39). Even with the rejection
of the legitimacy of such views, there is still a tendency to
differentiate mathematical or logical propositions from those of
the moral or political realm based on their formalism. While
opening the door to the possibility of a cognitivist account of
ethics, this has resulted in a state of affairs whereby moral claims
or beliefs are at worst not considered sufficient to be considered
candidates for objective truth-values, or; at best, admits a two
tiered truth pluralism wherein empirical propositions are consid
ered more true than moral propositions.
Those anticipating my argument may be expecting a re
hashing of some form of realism in which the possibility of
objective truth-values can be realized. However, the prospect of
achieving genuine moral beliefs is not to be found in the believer
independent metaphysics of some correspondence-based realism
advanced by philosophers such as Michael Dummett who, while
maintaining the possibility of objective truth-values, render the
truth or falsity of such propositions independent of the inquirer's
understanding. Instead, what is needed is a competing epistemic
account that holds a view that the truth of a particular belief or
proposition does not go beyond experience and inquiry. I con
tend that this account ista be found in pragmatism. The prag
matic epistemology originated by C. S. Peirce (1839-1913), and
subsequently developed by contemporary pragmatists such as
Cheryl Misak and Christopher Hookway in tl1eir recent works
Truth, Politics, and MoraUft}: Pragmatism and Deliberation and
Truth, Rationalift} and Pragmatism: Themes from Peirce provides an
elucidation and improvement of Peirce's account of truth and an
ideal normative framework in which a persuasive case can be
made for the possibility of objective moral knowledge.
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The focus of this paper will be to demonstrate that the
success of the pragmatic view lies in its ability to illustrate that
both empirical and moral propositions have determinate content
that, when asserted, leads to consequences and commitments;
when unpacked, these commitments show that genuine beliefs,
including moral beliefs, aim at truth and thus strive for objectiv
ity. Moreover, I will argue that such an account will provide not
only a robust account of truth that admits moral propositions as
candidates for determinate truth-values, but also sufficiently
defends against the spectre of moral relativism without resorting
to cultural imperialism. Although such an account in moral
philosophy - one that places truth at its core - appears different
from much of the contemporary discourse, it just may be what is
needed to firmly establish the attainment of genuine moral
knowledge.
I. Genuine Beliefs and the Commitments of Inquiry
In "The Fixation of Belief," Peirce argues that a true belief is one

that is fated to be agreed upon were we to inquire as far as we
could. Cheryl Misak improves this notion of truth to read that a
true belief is one upon which inquiry could not improve -: a
belief which would fit with experience and argument and which
would satisfy the aims of inquiry, no matter how much the issue
was subject to experiment, evaluation, and debate" (2000, 1). The
pragmatist rejects the correspondence theory of truth on the basis
that it disconnects truth from the practice of inquiry (i.e., a
proposition's veracity is not dependent on what evidence can
speak for or against it). From an epistemic perspective, this
pragmatic construct throws a lifeline to truth and objectivity and
rescues it from the mind-independent metaphysics that has fallen
into derision. Instead, we put in its place a process of inquiry in
which we strive to obtain the best belief - with "best" denoting a
belief that would fit with available evidence, argumentation, and
knowledge. On this view, we maintain an account of truth .that
does not go beyond experience. Although Peirce did not devote
an inordinate amount of time to discussing moral philosophy, his
work in epistemology does set a solid foundation for the possibil
ity of genuine moral knowledge.
Christopher Hookway reinforces the importance of the
internal connection between assertion and truth in the pragmatic
account of truth when he states that "every assertion that we
U
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make involves a commitment to the truth of the asserted proposi
tion" (62). Thus, our commitment to a proposition's truth is
manifested in our practice that to assert proposition "p" is analo
gous to asserting: TIp is true." However, we will see that we will
want to distinguish this view from that of the minimalist or
disquotationalist views, for under Peirce's assertoric account, we
obtain a more robust account of truth (and this will have impor
tant implications for moral inquiry, as we shall see).l A view of
truth expressed by the minimalist does not go far enough in
linking truth and inquiry, for the disquotationalist schema does
not express the commitments that we incur in discourse, and as a
result is not sufficient to account for the expectations and features
of a true belief that is necessary for inquiry (Misak, 2000, 59).
According to Hookway, Peirce's account of truth is best
understood not as a method of explaining the meaning of a
proposition's truth, but rather as an account of the commitments
we incur when we assert a proposition. When we assert a
proposition, it is done under the belief that it is the best belief
according to the available evidence and argumentation, and it
would stand up to future inquiry. However, we are also commit
ted to the view that under subsequent experience, our beliefs
may be thrown into doubt, which may necessitate modification
or abandonment for a new belief.
Yet Hookway adds an important qualification in this
pragmatic account of truth - he argues that Peirce holds that
when we assert a proposition "the content of what I commit
myself to can be somewhat indeterminate" (57). The case in
which truth is indeterminate, yet reality is determinate will
" .. .involve quite a complex propositional attitude, one that uses
the concept of truth to articulate an ideal to which the asserted
proposition does not fully measure up. In that case, asserting a
proposition commits me to its 'approximate truth/ not exactly its
truth" (64-5). Such commitments are tied into Peirce's fallibilismi
since we can never really know when we have reached the best
belief, we need to focus on the process and aims of inquiry itself.
History reveals that previous beliefs (both empirical and moral),
which we thought were absolute or could not be improved upon,
were subsequently revised or invalidated on further evidence or
argumentation. Inquiry is an active process in which new evi
dence and justifications continually test our beliefs, and if doubt
is cast on a particular belief, the opportunity is provided under
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the pragmatic account that allows for subsequent refinement or
replacement of that belief.

II. Dissolution of the FactjV due Dichotomy
Recall that under Misak's improvement of Peirce's account of
truth, a true belief is one that best fits with evidence and argu
mentation, and we would expect it to stand up to recalcitrant
experience. Yet it will be necessary to briefly elaborate on the
process of good inquiry and how we arrive at these best beliefs,
for on Hookway's account, "if we cannot do this, then Peirce's
clams about truth become trivial and uninteresting - an inquiry
counts as good enough only when it contributes to producing
agreement, even if we cannot say in detail what was good about
the inquirer's activities" (51). In both empirical and moral areas
of discourse, we tend to adopt a method of inquiry which results
in agreement and convergence - what Peirce called the scientific
method." What is important on Peirce's construal of such a
method is that it takes experience seriously, and has a very broad
account that what experience consists in.
Unlike the classical empiricists or logical positivists who
took a thin and constrained view of experience to include only
perceptual evidence from the sensory world that could speak for
or against the veracity of a particular belief, on Peirce's account,
experience is much more broadly construed as that which im
pinges on us - all "compulsions of thought" (Vol. 8, paragraph
101). Experience is more than what can be seen, heard, and felt in
the physical world, but anything that is "to be classed under the
species of perception wherein a positive qualitative content is
forced upon one's acknowledgement without reason or preten
sion to reason" (Vol. 7, paragraph 623). The central role of experi
ence, especially such a broad construal; under the Peircian notion
of pragmatism is imperative because it appears to leave room for
all propositions and beliefs (especially those concerned with
morality) to qualify as genuine and objective.
However, if the pragmatist is to succeed in the establish
ment of genuine moral knowledge, it will be necessary to dis
solve the fact/value dichotomy. It will not be necessary to show
that beliefs and propositions from empirical discourse are analo
gous to those in moral discourse, but only to show that both
maintain similar aims and commitments. Misak advocates the
need to adopt a radical holism that does not result in "driving a
/I
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wedge between various sorts of inquiri' and instead focus on the
features and commitments of areas of genuine inquiry in which
determinate truth-values are to be found to see if moral proposi
tions can measure up (2000, 84).
On the view of classical empiricists and logical positivists,
all genuine beliefs originated and were verified by perceptual
experience of the physical world. Yet it was well-recognized that
particular areas of scientific inquiry such as mathematics and
logic, while thought to be objective and candidates for truth
values, could not meet the test of experience. Hence, we were left
with the analytic/ synthetic distinction, which while acknowl
edging the inability of perceptual experience to verify mathemat
ical or logical beliefs, allowed for a dualism in which these
propositions were accorded a greater level of legitimacy in our
inquiries. However, even with the admittance of the Quine/
Duhem Thesis, which rejects the distinction between the analytic
and synthetic on the grounds that synthetic statements fail the
empiricist test, mathematical and logical propositions were still
accorded a legitimacy in our inquiries, which, while not indepen
dently verifiable, were taken to be objective and candidates for
truthvalues (85).
On Misak's account, since the view that Quine was pro
moting jettisons the tTaditional empiricist dichotomy, there is
nothing substantive that can be proffered from the exclusion of
moral judgements from the realm of genuine belief. If both
empirical and moral areas of inquiry are aiming at achieving the
best beliefs - beliefs that fit with theoretical and observational
experience - "there is no prima facie reason for denying moral
inquiry a place in our search for truth" (86). If we take the process
of inquiry seriously, that is, take it to have the aim of discovering
genuine beliefs with determinate truth-values, there is no reason
to suppose that given the dissolution of the fact/value dichotomy
and the broad Peircian view of experience, we are not strongly
warranted in treating moral inquiry as a genuine and objective
area of inquiry.
The view of radical holism that Misak advances is attrac
tive for it maintains an account of knowledge that requires
genuine beliefs to be accountable to experience - to the reasons
and evidence that strive to throw it into doubt. It is a view that,
by making experience the "new empirical test," strikes a difficult
balance between not prejudicing particular areas on inquiry
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based on artificial distinctions and maintaining a robust account
that does not require the devaluing of empirical propositions to
meet the needs of moral propositions. However, the pragmatist
does not want to advance a position that maintains that state
ments from areas of inquiry such as physics and morality are
analogous in every way. What the pragmatist has done is to
show that if we take a view of inquiry to be the achievement of
true beliefs that are resistant to recalcitrant evidence, we should
be able to see why moral beliefs can aspire to truth and objectiv
ity and can be good candidates for determinate truth-values. As
Ivfisak succinctly points out, once we can see that under Peirce's
account the line between fact and value is blurred, in that both
classes of belief (e.g. empirical and moral) are both constrained
by experience, we are warranted in expecting that inquiry into
these matters will result in determinate answers (1994,44). Both
empirical and moral beliefs are acquired through the same per
ceptual set and both are vulnerable to doubt and reclassification
by recalcitrant experience.
III. Moral Inquiry, Pluralism, and Relativism
"Moral deliberation has many marks of objectivity - the distinc
tion between thinking that one (or one's culture) is right and
being right, the use of moral beliefs in inferences, the thought
that we can discover that something is right or wrong and
improve our views, and the thought that it is appropriate, or even
required, that we give reasons and arguments for our beliefs, to
name a few" (Misak, 2000, 52). The objectivity of moral proposi
tions lies in their sensitivity to recalcitrant evidence and argu
mentation. If we were really a bunch of subjectivists who believe
that appeal to objective moral values were specious, why do we
deliberate and dispute so much about morality? I am inclined to
believe that we take moral inquiry seriously because we believe
that there is something to get correct - there is a right and a
wrong answer. We hope that there will be an upshot to our
activities, namely determinate answers with true-values.
The qualifications of our beliefs, which tend to be more
predominant in moral inquiry, show that as an area of discourse,
it is not as clean and ordered as mathematics. However, the
desire to abandon our project of moral knowledge on the basis of
these qualifications is misguided. In actuality, no area of dis
course is free from the need for qualification. If it is a legitimate
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area of inquiry, inquirers will be continually striving for obtain
ing the best belief. Even if it is conceded that qualification in
areas of discourse such as morality and politics is more prevalent
than in the natural and physical sciences, the same fact remains 
both empirical and moral areas of inquiry aim at getting the best
belief supported by available evidence and argumentation, and
as a result are vulnerable to qualification. Quite paradoxically,
the qualification of moral beliefs is seen as a weakness; however,
the phenomenology of moral inquiry should establish that our
practice of justifying moral belief speaks against the non
cognitivist. It speaks against those who do not think there is
good reason to see moral belief as being objective - those who
think that the best explanation of a person's moral judgements is
always a story about the person's cultural background or up
bringing" (52).
Yet we still run into difficulties. For showing that the
project of genuine moral knowledge is cognitive may be neces
sary, but it is not sufficient-even J. L. Mackie agrees that moral
claims pass any reasonable test for cognitive contenti however,
such a state of affairs does not necessitate the jump to viewing
moral claims as objective. Such objections are not novel; philoso
phers such as David Burne and G. E. Moore have raised similar
claims in the past. In the desire to show that moral knowledge
can be objective, the pragmatist is not interested in making the
case for some absolutist notion such as a categorical imperative
or some form of act utilitarianism.
The pragmatist admits in certain areas of moral inquiry
there will be underdetermination, and as a result there will be
instances of conflict between moral principles or morally permis
sible actions where it appears that there will be no upshot to our
inquiry. Does this indicate the absence of authenticity of objec
tive moral judgements (and the project)? I do not believe the
evidence bears out such a conclusion. Although this does neces
sitate caution, it does not indicate systematic relativism or doubt
about the validity of moral judgements as truth-value candidates,
for no belief is immune from revision or doubt. Although tll.ere is
a higher frequency in moral inquiry as opposed to mathematical
inquiry, both areas of inquiry aim at achieving the best belief - a
belief that fits with available evidence, argumentation, and
knowledge.
The strength of the pragmatist project lies inits ability to
II
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(in the midst of divergent opinions and values) provide a robust
account of ethics that can objectively criticize particular beliefs or
actions as amoral, without resorting to cultural imperialism.
Misak provides a persuasive argument for why such a state of
affairs of substantive homogeneity in morality is not problematic:
But the fact that the compulsion of internal experience is
less pervasive and less persuasive and less insistent
means that the apparent lack of consensus on moral
matters does not pose a serious problem for the Peircian
project. There is a remarkable amount of consensus
with respect to moral judgements and this can be ex
plained by the force of internal experience. Any lack of
consensus can be explained away by the fact that the
way things are in the moral world does not impinge
upon us in quite the same way things are in the empiri
cal world. Thus, there is nothing debilitating about
some (or many) undetermined moral questions. (1994,
45)

The pragmatist will not want to assert that resolution of ethical
dilemmas will be as clear-cut and uncontroversial as solving a
mathematical problem - they are clearly two different areas of
discourse. Yet this lower level of consensus and agreement on
moral matters does not necessitate that we give up on the project
of truth and objectivity in morality. It is this challenge - what
John Rawls calls the "fact of pluralism" which the pragmatist
must face if the prospect for moral knowledge will be successful.
We can accommodate the reality of pluralism in Western
society under Peirce's cognitivist account without succumbing to
moral relativism. The pragmatist provides the only persuasive
account which counters the relativist charge that an absence of
agreement or performance of moral customs or actions is suffi
cient to establish that there is no trace of objectivity in moral
inquiry.2 But the pragmatist will be the first to admit that moral
ity is a special area of inquiry that does not easily admit to
universalization. "We cannot be quite sure that the community
ever will settle down to an unalterable conclusion upon any
given question. Even if they do so for the most part, we have no
reason to think the unanimity will be quite complete, nor can we
rationally presume any overwhelming consensus of opinion will
be reached upon every question" (peirce, 1935, paragraph 610).
Moreover, the pragmatist will need to be careful when
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placing truth at the center of his or her ethical account; that one
particular conception of the good is not endorsed as the good, and
the rest designated as false or amoral. The pragmatist acknowl
edges that human lives are better governed internally, and she
will not want to dictatorially pick one particular conception of
the good life and force it upon everybody. Instead, pragmatism
works well with our democratic liberal practices in which it is
recognized that our lives are better governed internally and that
individuals can subscribe to numerous acceptable conceptions of
the good (Misak, 1994,48). While in a pluralistic SOciety, we will
find many well-formed and permissible conceptions of the good
life that all have one thing in common. Each comprehensive
doctrine is promoting a conception of the good which results in
the production of moral judgements with an associative truth
value that we hope will not be overturned by subsequent evidence
and argumentation.
But a pressing problem remains - although we can main
tain that moral beliefs strive towards truth and objectivity, how
does the pragmatist avoid what Paul Taylor called the ethnocen
tric fallacy (563-4)? How do we avoid designating non-liberal
values as false (because they do not accord with our own)? It
almost becomes an exercise of determining not whether the
moral judgements are true, but whether they accord with West
ern values! The pragmatist will want to be wary of such a state of
affairs because she will want to maintain Peirce's account of the
"community of inquiries." Unlike some contemporary pragma
tists of Richard Rorty's sb'ipe, who argue for the existence of
various communities of inquirers (which inevitably lead to rela
tivism), we are better served with Peirce's conception whereby
there is only one community of inquirers - all inquirers bound by
the requirement to justify their beliefs and actions to the entire
community of inquirers, and not particular segments of it. If we
are to escape from charges of relativism in the realm of moral
inqUiry, it will be essential to hold all inquirers accountable to the
commitments of truth and objectivity, and not allow particular
beliefs or actions that are resistant to recalcitrant experience.
It provides the only substantive argument against sub
stantive homogeneity or the jack-booted thugs who come to take
you away in the night that is epistemically robust. We can say
that such conceptions are certainly not in the interest of converg
ing on the best conception of the good life, but simply and
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advantageously can identify a conjunction of permissible concep
tions of the good life that fit with available evidence and argu
mentation. For instance, while Catholicism or vegetarianism
would be considered acceptable conceptions of the good life,
anarchism and Nazism would not be, and could be soundly
criticized, for views of discrimination and violence do not aim at
beliefs that fit with available argumentation, reasons, and evi
dence. "Thus there is room for underdetermination and plural
ism in a Peircian view of the objective status of moral judge
ments. Our moral inquiries are legitimized without positing a
correspondence between our moral judgements and moral facts,
and without cultural imperialism. For an account of the truth of
moral judgements that initially looked so implausible, this, I
suggest, is no small thing" (Misak, 1994, 48).
Conclusion
Knowing that all empirical and moral propositions and beliefs
are vulnerable to recalcitrant evidence or argumentation, the
pragmatic epistemology of Peirce's stripe is the only account that
can maintain philosophically robust and identify serious areas of
inquiry that strive for truth and objectivity.
The pragmatist does not want to suggest that propositions
such as "The contemplative life is the good life" and "2 + 2 = 4"
should be seen as analogous entities entitled to identical levels of
certainty and reasonableness. To think otherwise would miscon
strue the aspiration of what the pragmatic elucidation can bring
in the area of genuine moral knowledge. What should be taken
away from such an account is that in genuine areas of discourse,
the process of inquiry will be aiming for truth.
In the area of moral inquiry, for instance, when dealing
with the question of the good life, the strength of the pragmatic
cognitivist position is not that it promises to identify the one, true
conception of the good - instead, the pragmatic epistemology can
identify various well-formed and rational conceptions of the
good life, while being able to mount a robust challenge to amoral
or illogical conceptions such as those advanced by the Nazis. It
can provide a substantive objection and criticism of amoral be
liefs or actions, while forcing relativists and sceptics to hide in the
comer. One cannot make the case, as the relativist or sceptic
does, that morality is simply a matter of expressing one's subjec
tive preferences and dislikes, and then turn around and tell a
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group like the Nazis that genocide is wrong - it is only an
account which places truth and objectivity at the center of moral
inquiry that will allow us to levy justified criticism. Pragmatism
provides such an account.
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NOTES
I The minimalist or disquotationalist view simply states that a proposi
tion is true if and only if the state of affairs it represents is true [''p'' is
true if and only if p]. An instance of this account of truth would be:
"grass is green" is true if and only if grass is green. Thus, the truth of
the proposition "grass is green" is only true ifin fact grass is actually
green.
2 Relativists will often charge that it is the de Jacto absence of uniform
adherence to moral beliefs and actions between different communities
or nations that proves that morality is not objective. It is often charged
that empirical disciplines, such as science, are the same in the world no
matter where you go - there is not such thing, for instance, as Chinese
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